People with a lower level of education, a lower occupational class, or a lower level of income tend to die at a younger age, and to have, within their shorter lives, a higher prevalence of many different health problems. 1 These health inequalities are substantial, and usually amount to between 5 and 10 years difference in average life expectancy at birth, and between 10 and 20 years difference in disability-free life expectancy.
The persistence of socioeconomic inequalities in health is one of the great disappointments of public health. It is difficult to understand that the 'welfare state' has not eliminated, or at least substantially reduced, these inequalities. In the second half of the 20th century, most European countries have developed extensive welfare arrangements that include various measures to redistribute income (e.g. by progressive taxation and social security benefits) as well as a range of collectively financed provisions (not only in the field of health care but also in other health-relevant areas such as housing, education and leisure facilities). There is good evidence that welfare policies have contributed to a reduction of inequalities in income, housing quality, health care access and other social and economic outcomes, 2 but the persistence of very large health inequalities clearly shows that these policies have been insufficient to eliminate the health consequences of social and economic inequality. This is puzzling, and made even more puzzling by the lack of association between the generosity of welfare policies in a country on the one hand, and the magnitude of its health inequalities on the other hand. Comparative studies have found that socioeconomic inequalities in mortality and morbidity are not consistently smaller in countries with more generous welfare policies (such as the Nordic countries) than they are in other countries (such as the United Kingdom with its more liberal welfare regime, or Southern European countries with their more family-based welfare arrangements). 3 This is illustrated in figure 1 , which shows the magnitude of relative inequalities in mortality between the ages of 30 and 79 years by level of education in 20 European countries. The rate ratio of mortality among men, comparing the low with the high educated, ranges between 1.50 in Spain to 2.89 in Lithuania among men (indicating a 4-fold variation in the relative excess mortality among low educated men), and between 1.30 in Spain to 3.24 in Lithuania among women (indicating a 7-fold variation in the relative excess mortality among low educated women). Generally speaking, relative inequalities in mortality are largest in Central & Eastern Europe (represented by the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia), and smallest in the South (represented by regions in Spain and Italy). The same applies to absolute inequalities in mortality, as measured by the rate difference of mortality between the low and high educated. 1 This shows that the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark), which are well-known for their egalitarian policies and generous welfare arrangements, do not have particularly small inequalities in mortality-on the contrary, as can be seen in figure 1 , inequalities among Finnish men and among Norwegian men and women even stand out as larger than in the rest of Western Europe.
How to explain these unexpected patterns? Due to a series of studies funded by the European Commission we know at least part of the answer. We summarize the results of these studies below, focusing on educational inequalities in mortality for which comparable data are available for a large number of European countries. However, largely similar results apply to occupational inequalities in mortality.
The Nordic paradox
The persistence of substantial inequalities in mortality in the Nordic countries-and in continental-European countries with similarly advanced welfare states like the Netherlands-has puzzled researchers ever since the first rigorously conducted comparative studies shattered the illusion that health inequalities in these countries were much smaller than in other European countries. 4 The explanation of this paradox is likely to include a combination of three interrelated factors. 5 The first is that-quite simply-the welfare state has far from eliminated inequalities in material resources. Although the magnitude of income inequalities in the Nordic countries is smaller, and the prevalence of poverty is lower than it is in most other European countries, substantial inequalities in income, wealth, housing conditions and other material living conditions remain. Even in the Nordic countries, a sizable proportion of the low educated live in poverty, e.g. measured as living on less than 60% of median income, which increases their risk of a variety of health problems.
But why are inequalities in mortality not smaller in the Nordic countries than in many other European countries, in line with their smaller income inequalities and lower prevalence of poverty? To understand that, we need one or more additional explanations. The second factor is that while the welfare state was being built up, important changes in social stratification and social mobility have occurred which have strengthened old and created new social inequalities. Due to the rise of the service economy and the expansion of higher education, the proportion of people in routine and manual occupational classes and of low educated in the population has shrunk considerably. As compared to the larger groups of people with a low education or in routine and manual occupations in previous generations, this smaller group is likely to be more disadvantaged socially, and also to have a more unfavourable composition in terms of individual characteristics such as cognitive ability. 6 Also, survey data show that despite their larger numbers, the high educated in recent generations are more, not less, advantaged than those in previous generations. For example, over time a high level of education has become more strongly associated with a high income, 7 and the high educated increasingly marry among each other and so accumulate advantage within couples and families. 8 As these trends are even more advanced in the Nordic countries than elsewhere in Europe, this likely contributes to their surprisingly large inequalities in mortality.
The third factor is that while population health has improved and mortality has declined, the higher educated have benefited more from these improvements than the lower educated. When mortality declines, we generally observe that the speed of decline (in terms of percent per annum change) is faster among the high educated. 9 This is because prevention and treatment interventions generally have a higher reach and greater effectiveness among the high educated, due to, among others, easier access and higher utilization of care, lower prevalence of co-morbidity and better treatment adherence. The high educated are also more inclined, and find it easier, to change their behaviour in order to protect or promote their health. As a consequence, smoking, lack of physical activity, unhealthy dietary habits and obesity are far more common among the low than the high educated. 10 In many of these areas of health improvement the Nordic countries are more advanced than other European countries, either because of their superior health care or public health systems, or because of autonomous behavioural trends. This not only means faster health improvements, but also more scope for inequalities in health improvement to occur.
These three factors apply to all four Nordic countries, but it is important to note that Sweden has smaller relative and absolute inequalities in mortality than the other Nordic countries (figure 1). One could even say that the Nordic paradox does not really apply to Sweden. Part of this may be explained by the fact that Sweden has the lowest prevalence of poverty of the four, but a lower prevalence of smoking also plays a role. Partly due to the use of 'snus' (a form of smokeless tobacco which is particularly prevalent among low educated Swedish men 11 ) absolute inequalities in smoking in Sweden are smaller than in other Nordic countries, which explains a substantial part of its smaller inequalities in mortality.
The Southern miracle
Southern European countries have small inequalities in mortalitythis does not only apply to Spain and Italy (figure 1) but also to Portugal, Malta, Greece and Cyprus. These are not countries with particularly egalitarian social or health care policies, so the explanation must be sought elsewhere. Their favourable profile has emerged over the past three or four decades, and is a result of the fact that the widening of inequalities in mortality that occurred in most other European countries did not occur in Spain and Italy. 12 Several of the factors mentioned above for the Nordic paradox are likely to play a role again-but now in a reverse direction. During the 20th century, economic, social and cultural modernization occurred later in Southern Europe than in other European countries-a situation that was aggravated by the general stagnation under the military dictatorships that ruled Portugal, Spain and Greece until the middle of the 1970 s. This delayed modernization has miraculously helped to avoid a widening of inequalities in mortality, via two pathways. 13 First, the delay in expansion of the service sector and of higher education implies that, particularly among the older generations which dominate current mortality rates, the lower educated are still numerous and less socially marginalized than in other European countries, and that a larger and multiply advantaged higher educated group has not yet emerged.
Second, the social and cultural modernization that usually accompanies economic modernization, in the form of changes in e.g. the position of women, cultural values, and dietary, drinking and smoking patterns, also occurred later in Southern Europe. The best documented example of this is the delay between Southern Europe and other European countries in timing of the smoking epidemic. Smoking was picked up later in Spain and Italy, particularly among women, and as a result the large inequalities in smoking behaviour that we observe in other parts of Western Europe have not yet arrived. Among women in Spain, smoking-related mortality is still higher among high educated than among low educated women, which keeps inequalities in all-cause mortality very low. 14 That traditional values do not protect against all kinds of inequalities is clear from the large inequalities in obesity seen among Southern European women, which are probably related to traditional gender roles (particularly higher numbers of children and less leisure time physical exercise among low educated women, and more labour force participation and stronger social norms for thinness among high educated women). 15 However, because obesity is a much weaker determinant of mortality, this does not compensate the near absence of smoking as a determinant of mortality among the low educated in Southern Europe.
In addition to smoking, other culturally determined factors also play a role. Smaller inequalities in cardiovascular disease mortality in the South are partly due to the persistence of the Mediterranean diet in lower socioeconomic groups-which is equivalent to saying that they are due to a delay in shift towards a more western-style diet. The persistence of these traditional dietary patterns among the low educated in Spain, Italy and other Mediterranean countries is helped by the abundant availability and low costs of healthy dietary items like fruits, vegetables and olive oil in Southern Europe. Also, when the ischemic heart disease epidemic finally reached Southern Europe, therapeutic advances that had been made elsewhere helped to keep mortality rates low, and as there is reasonably good access to health care in these countries for lower socioeconomic groups large inequalities in ischemic heart disease mortality could be avoided. 13 
The Eastern disaster
As can be seen in figure 1 , the biggest contrast in the magnitude of inequalities in mortality within Europe is that between Central & Eastern Europe and the rest of the subcontinent, and it is therefore no wonder that it has been possible to identify the causes of the disastrously large inequalities in mortality in these countries ( figure  1 ). Inequalities in mortality in countries like Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania are huge for most causes of death, and these exceptionally large inequalities have arisen relatively recently, during the profound political and economic changes that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union around 1990. 16 The political transition towards liberal democracy and the economic transition towards capitalism were accompanied by a temporary rise of mortality in many Central & Eastern European countries, which was due to a rise in unemployment and poverty, a breakdown of protective social, public health and health care institutions and a rise in excessive drinking and other risk factors for premature mortality. However, this rise of mortality was not equally shared within the population, and mainly occurred among those with a lower level of education. Apparently, people with a higher level of education were better able to protect themselves against increased health risks, and even to benefit from new opportunities for health gains, e.g. the introduction of new cardiovascular drugs from the West. 17 As a consequence, inequalities in mortality have exploded in Central & Eastern Europe. This can best be seen in Hungary and the Czech Republic, two countries for which we have data from before the political and economic transitions which show that educational inequalities in mortality were still very small during the 1980 s. In-depth analyses have shown that the larger inequalities in mortality in Central & Eastern Europe which emerged after 1990 can be explained by a combination of factors, including at least the following: a high prevalence of, and large inequalities in, poverty; a high prevalence of, and large inequalities in, excessive alcohol consumption and smoking and inequalities in access to good quality health care. 18 These unfavourable conditions all relate directly or indirectly to the political and economic changes of the 1990 s. The rise of poverty is related to a rapid restructuring of the economy leading to a decline in national income and a rise of income inequality and unemployment which, in the absence of adequate social security systems, had disastrous consequences for large parts of the population.
The rise of alcohol-related mortality in Central & Eastern Europe has been relatively well documented. In many of these countries excessive alcohol consumption surged around 1990 when cheap alcohol flooded the market, and when alcohol markets were liberalized and alcohol control measures discontinued. The economic crisis and mass unemployment with the resulting stress in the population also played a role, and when the economy finally recovered rising income and increased affordability of alcohol further facilitated excessive alcohol consumption. Cultural norms also promoted less healthy drinking patterns. That the rise of alcohol-related mortality was so much stronger among the low than among the high educated probably relates to their greater exposure to economic stress and greater sensitivity to lower prices. 19 
Conclusions
Several lessons can be drawn from the European experience of health inequalities. One is that health inequalities, although persistent and ubiquitous, are also very dynamic. In other words, they are not a law of nature, at least not in their current pattern and magnitude, and it may therefore be possible to reduce them if we find the right entrypoints. Also, although smaller inequalities in mortality in Southern Europe seem to be a historical coincidence rather than the outcome of deliberate policies, the Spanish and Italian examples suggest that large inequalities in mortality are not inevitable, at least in principle.
However, another lesson is that health inequalities are influenced in sometimes unexpected ways by factors that are not under our control. The experience of the Nordic countries, which have done more than most other European countries to reduce social and economic inequalities, shows that countervailing factors (in this case, partly autonomous trends in social stratification and social mobility and in health-related behaviour) can partly outdo the effect of generous welfare arrangements and smaller inequalities in material living conditions. Temporarily rising inequalities in health may also be a largely inevitable consequence of modernization.
All this suggests that it is unlikely that we will be able to eliminate health inequalities soon. Nevertheless, they are a mirror of society that it is worth looking into, and a better understanding of the determinants of health inequalities has given us a number of entrypoints for policy that we should carefully and systematically exploit.
